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Abstract 
 
Poorly designed stated preference (SP) studies are subject to a number of well-known 
biases, but many of these biases can be minimized when they are anticipated ex ante and 
accommodated in the study’s design or during data analysis. We identify another source 
of potential bias, which we call ―scenario adjustment,‖ where respondents assume that 
the substantive alternative(s) in an SP choice set, in their own particular case, will be 
different from what the survey instrument describes. We use an existing survey, 
developed to ascertain willingness to pay for private health-risk reduction programs, to 
demonstrate a strategy to control and correct for scenario adjustment in the estimation of 
willingness to pay. This strategy involves data from carefully worded follow-up 
questions, and ex post econometric controls, for each respondent’s subjective departures 
from the intended choice scenario. Our research has important implications for the design 
of future SP surveys. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Recent interest in behavioral economics has led researchers to revisit instances where 
conventional empirical models of rational consumer decision-making may have failed to 
provide an adequate picture of choice behavior. Bernheim and Rangel (2009), for example, 
note that ―it is often difficult to formulate coherent and normatively compelling 
rationalizations for non-standard choice patterns‖ (i.e. when consumers do not choose in the 
way that our utility-maximization models would predict).  They suggest that ―ancillary 
conditions‖ which describe the context of a choice can affect choice outcomes.  Our 
research explores subjective beliefs about a key attribute in a choice scenario as an example 
of one such ancillary condition. 
Researchers have also long recognized that subjective beliefs are an important 
determinant of consumers’ choices (Dominitz and Manski 2004; Manski 2004). For 
example, individuals may have differing beliefs about their vulnerability with respect to 
particular illnesses, as well as the likely timing of their own risks. These beliefs may 
determine their willingness to pay to reduce these health risks (e.g., to purchase organic 
foods), to attempt to measure their risks (e.g., to purchase a new diagnostic test not currently 
covered by insurance), or to buy extra insurance against undesirable health risk outcomes 
(e.g., to purchase Medi-Gap policies). As subjective beliefs change, individual behavior is 
likely to change as well. Thus, an individual’s subjective beliefs are a prime example of 
ancillary conditions associated with a choice.  
As ancillary conditions for choices, subjective beliefs are also likely to play an 
important role when research subjects answer questions in stated preference (SP) surveys 
used to value non-market goods. This paper contributes to the literature by examining 
certain types of subjective beliefs in stated preferences research. An SP survey describes a 
scenario in which the respondent is offered a hypothetical opportunity to purchase one or 
more costly programs that yield particular sets of individual-specific consequences. When 
asked to make choices about health-related programs, for example, individuals may hold 
strong prior beliefs about many aspects of the alternatives in the choice scenario, including 
their own risks of particular illnesses, the time profile of those illness-specific risks over 
their lifetimes, the effectiveness of preventive actions, the effectiveness of the probable 
treatments, etc. When respondents hold prior beliefs about any aspect of the scenario that 
may diverge from the researcher-prescribed information, three possibilities arise:  (1) 
respondents may replace their beliefs about aspects of the scenario with the information 
provided by the researcher; (2) they may retain their beliefs and instead reject the choice 
scenario as irrelevant or unrealistic, often resulting in a protest response, or (3) they may 
accept the scenario but ―adjust‖ some of its informational aspects to fit their own personal 
situation, history or context. We define ―scenario adjustment‖ to occur in the third case, 
where respondents impute or modify some aspect of a given choice scenario based upon 
their personal beliefs.  These types of scenario adjustments constitute important ancillary 
conditions for a choice.  
This paper therefore concerns the identification of scenario adjustment as a behavioral 
phenomenon affecting choices. We also illustrate one strategy for correction. We take 
advantage of an existing stated preference survey concerning prospective health risk 
reductions, described in Cameron and DeShazo (2009). This survey is designed to elicit 
choices that allow the researcher to infer willingness to pay for privately purchased 
diagnostic programs which reduce the prospective risk that respondents will experience 
specific illness profiles over their remaining lifespans. An illness profile consists of a 
description of a sequence of future health states associated with a major illness that the 
respondent may experience with some baseline probability. The specific type of ―scenario 
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adjustment‖ problem we address in this paper has to do with each respondent’s degree of 
acceptance of the stated latency of the illness (i.e. time until the onset of symptoms). 
Latency is specified as an attribute of each illness profile described in the choice sets used in 
the survey.  
Our assessment of the consequences of scenario adjustment (and thus our potential 
correction strategy) is made possible because our respondents are asked appropriate 
debriefing questions after each stated choice question concerning each of the health-risk 
reduction programs. These debriefing questions allow us to distinguish between respondents 
who appear to accept the latency information given in the choice scenario (and therefore 
presumably answer the choice question based on the latencies described in the choice 
scenario) from those who subjectively adjust the latency information in the scenario (and 
therefore appear to have answered a somewhat different question). Some individuals 
underestimate the latency period—they believe that the program’s benefits, in their own 
case, would start sooner. Other individuals overestimate the latency period. If subjective 
latency affects willingness to pay (WTP) for risk reductions, then respondents’ latency 
perceptions can influence their estimated WTP amounts.
1
  
If scenario adjustment is ignored, it is possible that this behavior on the part of 
respondents may cause the researcher to underestimate WTP for some respondents and 
overestimate WTP for others, to varying degrees. The opposing effects are unlikely to be 
exactly offsetting. In cases like this, researchers should probably calculate and compare 
estimates of WTP both with and without corrections for scenario adjustment. But this 
implies that, early in the process of survey design, researchers should try to anticipate the 
dimensions along which respondents may be inclined to adjust the stated choice scenario, 
despite the survey designer’s best efforts. Suitable debriefing questions need to be included 
in the survey to permit a formal assessment of the extent of this behavior. 
We note that corrections for scenario adjustment must be considered in relation to the 
practice of ―libertarian paternalism‖ as discussed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and Smith 
(2007). ―Libertarian paternalism‖ involves honoring consumer sovereignty to the greatest 
extent possible (the libertarian part), but intervening to override some aspects of behavior 
when the researcher believes that these are mistakes (the paternalism part). For example, 
suppose the researcher is attempting to value removal of the health risks associated with a 
toxic waste site. The survey may state a particular objective existing risk, but one-third of 
the survey’s respondents may believe that the risk is ten times as large as the stated objective 
risk. Willingness to pay could be estimated based on each individual’s subjective risks. 
However, to generate an estimate of social benefits based on the objective risks, the 
researcher may counterfactually simulate what this third of the sample would have been 
willing to pay, had they believed the lower objective risks instead. One possible 
accommodation for scenario adjustment, as described in this paper, likewise involves 
simulating the preference parameters that would have been estimated under ideal conditions. 
In this situation, the counterfactual is the case where subjects do not approach the choice 
using their own subjective estimates of latency, but instead ―buy into‖ the attributes of each 
illness profile as described in the survey. 
There is one final consideration when contemplating scenario adjustment in stated 
preference studies. Individuals may adjust choice scenarios analogously in real-life choice 
situations. If scenario adjustment happens with similar frequency in actual markets, then 
                                                 
1
 Scenario adjustment might occur as follows. Suppose a male respondent has a family history of 
heart disease at age fifty. In his copy of the survey, the stated choice scenario that involves heart 
disease may specify that this illness would lead to moderate and/or severe pain and disability starting 
at age seventy. However, given his private knowledge, he might answer the question as though the 
benefits of the proposed risk reduction program would begin at age fifty.  
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perhaps these misalignments are an unavoidable part of how consumers truly behave in real 
markets. If a stated preference study is designed to predict future actual choice behavior, 
perhaps the SP choice models should allow people to make the same ―mistakes‖ that they 
would make in real life. However, if the goal is welfare assessment based on WTP under 
conditions of full information, then corrections are more justified. Of course, if scenario 
adjustment is, for some reason, more pronounced in hypothetical choice scenarios, as 
opposed to real market conditions, then perhaps the researcher should correct the 
misalignment in order to more accurately predict respondents’ WTP under real conditions. 
Researchers should put forth their best effort to make the choice scenarios in a stated 
preference survey as plausible as possible, for as many respondents as possible. Despite 
these best efforts, however, it may be impossible for researchers to fully anticipate the likely 
credibility of all dimensions of a randomized choice scenario from the perspective of every 
individual who might participate in the survey. The best strategy to deal with any residual 
scenario adjustments may be for researchers to anticipate that this behavior is inevitable in 
some proportion of cases and to plan for the option to assess and correct for it.  
Our paper illustrates how some carefully worded debriefing questions can be used to 
measure the approximate extent of one type of scenario adjustment. Our econometric model 
controls for these scenario adjustments, and we use counterfactual simulations to infer what 
would have been the estimated preferences (and hence WTP) had each individual in the 
sample fully accepted this key attribute in the stated choice scenario. The paper proceeds as 
follows: Section 2 reviews in more detail the related literature on perceptions and SP. 
Section 3 briefly describes our SP survey and the data it produces. Section 4 briefly reviews 
a utility-theoretic choice model used to analyze respondents’ program preferences. Section 5 
discusses how to control for scenario adjustment and conveys our empirical results, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Related Literature 
 
Researchers certainly recognize that respondents bring their beliefs and perceptions about 
aspects of a choice scenario into a choice setting (Manski 2004).
2
  Researchers are also 
aware that the information provided in an SP choice scenario may conflict with respondents’ 
beliefs and perceptions, in some cases, due to the random assignment of attributes in 
efficiently designed conjoint choice sets. Some respondents may be presented with scenarios 
containing unrealistic or irrelevant choice alternatives, relative to the individual’s beliefs, 
despite these being plausible for the average respondent. A tension may thus arise between 
the efficient design of a choice set and respondents’ expectations regarding which kinds of 
choice alternatives are realistic or relevant (Louviere et al. 2000, Louviere 2006).  
When confronted with unrealistic or irrelevant choice scenarios, respondents may issue 
protest responses. Outright scenario rejection may lead a respondent to state that they prefer 
the status quo alternative, but they do this for reasons that have nothing to do with their 
preferences or the constraints they face (or they may refuse to make any choice at all). This 
behavior may indicate merely that they doubt the viability of the hypothetical product or 
proposed program, rather than implying that they would not value it if it were guaranteed to 
                                                 
2
 For example Adamowicz, et al. (1997) and Poor, et al. (2001) compare WTP estimates from choice 
models that use both objectively measured and subjectively perceived levels of attributes. 
Experimental economists (e.g. Plott and Zeiler 2005) have examined the role of subjective beliefs in 
explaining the gap between WTP and willingness to accept (WTA).  
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work as advertised.
3
  When some choices may be protest responses, or belie some type of 
scenario rejection, it is important to distinguish between these protest responses and other 
―good‖ responses (although in practice it can be difficult to draw these distinctions).4  
Bateman et al. (2002) suggest several methods to identify protest responses such as follow-
up questions about why respondents answered the way they did. Strazzera et al. (2003) also 
offer possible corrections for selection bias caused by protest zeroes in contingent valuation 
studies.  
Instead of outright scenario rejection, we address in this paper the phenomenon of 
scenario adjustment—where respondents feel that the level of some attribute is somewhat 
implausible, but this problem does not derail the choice process entirely. Instead, the 
individual may implicitly replace this implausible stated attribute with something that he or 
she deems more plausible, and then make a decision based on this mental edit to the choice 
set. Outright scenario rejection may be difficult enough to detect, but scenario adjustment—
which is a matter of degree, rather than an all-or-nothing proposition—may be more 
insidious and therefore even more difficult to detect. Debriefing questions asked after 
respondents make the key choice(s) can be invaluable for this purpose.  
SP researchers have long realized the potential for debriefing questions to help them 
understand the perceptions of the respondent during the choice process. Several researchers 
have already used specific debriefing questions for detection of scenario adjustment. Carson 
et al. (1994) ask subjects whether they believed that the pollutants in question could actually 
cause the environmental problems stated in the choice scenario and whether they believed 
that natural processes would return things to normal within the stated number of years. 
When respondents said they did not believe the stated natural recovery time, they were 
asked if they thought the true recovery time was more or less than the stated time. In a 
similar vein, Viscusi and Huber (2006) ask their respondents for subjective assessments of 
the probability that the program in question will actually produce the advertised benefits.
5
  
Flores and Strong (2007) find that subjective beliefs about project costs influence choice in a 
contingent valuation survey. Similarly, Mitani (2007) finds that subjective perceptions about 
the risk of extinction influence choice for programs that reduce the threat of extinction of an 
endangered species. Based on this growing body of evidence that scenario adjustment can 
matter, we propose in this paper that researchers routinely plan in advance to quantify it and 
control for it to the extent possible, or at least to anticipate the need for systematic 
sensitivity analyses with respect to scenario adjustment. 
 
3 Available Choice Data 
 
Market data from which to infer individuals’ demands for health risk reductions is not 
adequate. Thus, Cameron and DeShazo (2009) use stated preference methods to elicit 
preferences for programs to reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality in a general 
                                                 
3
 For a more detailed description of protest responses and protest bids, see Bateman et al. (2002) and 
Champ et al. (2003). Rejection of the proposed payment vehicle (e.g. a tax or a user fee) can be 
another form of protest. 
4
 Even in real choice situations, a consumer may choose not to buy a product simply because the 
seller’s claims about it seem ―too good to be true.‖  If the consumer could verify the product’s 
qualities, however, she would actually make the purchase. This suggests that scenario rejection (and 
scenario adjustment) may thus be fairly common in real markets, too. 
5
 Burghart et al. (2007) extend a random utility model to include estimated scenario adjustment 
parameters that capture whether respondents appear to believe and/or pay attention to certain key 
attributes of alternatives in the choice set, conditional on the functional form of the choice model. 
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population sample of adults in the United States.
6
  In brief, the survey consists of five 
modules.
7
  The first module asks respondents about their subjective risks of contracting the 
major illnesses or injuries which are the focus of the survey, how lifestyle changes would 
alter their risks of these illnesses, and how taxing they perceive it would be to implement 
these lifestyle changes. 
The second module is a tutorial that explains the concept of an ―illness profile,‖ which 
is a sequence of future health states. An illness profile includes the number of years before 
the individual becomes sick, illness-years while the individual is sick, remission/post-illness 
years after the individual recovers from the illness, and lost life-years if the individual dies 
earlier than he would have without the disease. Then the tutorial informs the individual that 
he might be able to purchase a new, minimally invasive diagnostic program that would 
reduce his risk of experiencing each illness profile. Each illness-related risk-reduction 
program consists of a simple finger-prick blood test that would not be covered by the 
individual’s health insurance plan.8 
The third, and key, module of each survey involves a set of five different three-
alternative conjoint choice experiments where the individual is asked to choose between two 
possible health-risk reducing programs and a status quo alternative. One example of a choice 
scenario is presented in Figure 1. Each program reduces the risk that the individual will 
experience a specific illness profile for a major illness or injury (i.e. one of five specific 
types of cancer, heart attack, heart disease, stroke, respiratory illness, diabetes, traffic 
accident or Alzheimer’s disease). Each individual-specific illness profile is described to the 
respondent in terms of the baseline probability of experiencing the illness or injury, future 
age at onset, duration, symptoms and treatments, and eventual outcome (recovery or death). 
The corresponding risk reduction program is defined by the expected risk reduction and by 
its monthly and annual cost. 
Ordinarily, of course, the researcher would use a carefully blocked experimental design 
to determine the mix of attributes in each choice set that will maximize estimation 
efficiency. These types of designs are possible when any respondent can receive any choice 
set and when the labels on alternatives do not circumscribe the plausible mix of attribute 
levels. When using a conventional structured experimental design, the researcher should 
document the design statistics (see Scarpa and Rose, 2008) and conduct a number of tests of 
preference regularity.
9
 In this study, however, each illness profile is described as a partition 
of the individual’s remaining lifetime into at most four distinct intervals capturing time in 
each of four health states. Given that we use a standing consumer panel, we are able to know 
in advance each potential respondent’s age and gender, and thus to tailor the choice sets to 
each individual. The same choice sets can be shared only by people of the same gender and 
age—135 different groups which number only one to two dozen people each, even in the 
thickest part of the data. Groups this small are inappropriate for many of the design-related 
                                                 
6
 Knowledge Networks, Inc administered an internet survey to a sample of 2,439 of their panelists 
with a response rate of 79 percent. 
7
 For more information on the survey instrument and the data, see the appendices which accompany 
Cameron and DeShazo (2009): Appendix A – Survey Design & Development, Appendix B – Stated 
Preference Quality Assurance and Quality Control Checks, Appendix C – Details of the Choice Set 
Design, Appendix D – The Knowledge Networks Panel and Sample Selection Corrections, Appendix 
E – Model, Estimation and Alternative Analyses, and Appendix F – Estimating Sample Codebook. 
8
 The cost of the program would cover the test and any indicated medications or treatments to reduce 
the risk of suffering the illness in question. 
9
 With few enough attribute levels and monotonic preferences, one might use something like the 
Gauss program called VALIDTST.PRG, prepared by F. Reed Johnson, to look for stability in 
repetitions of the same choice, within-pair and across-set monotonicity, consistency and transitivity 
relations, and dominance (see Appendix B to Cameron and DeShazo 2009). 
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Figure 1 – One example of a randomized choice scenario10 
Choose the program that reduces the illness that you most want to avoid. But 
think carefully about whether the costs are too high for you. If both programs are 
too expensive, then choose Neither Program. 
If you choose “neither program”, remember that you could die early from a 
number of causes, including the ones described below. 
 
Program A 
for Diabetes 
Program B 
for Heart Attack 
Symptoms/ 
Treatment 
Get sick when 77 years-old 
6 weeks of hospitalization 
No surgery 
Moderate pain for 7 years 
 
Get sick when 67 years-old 
No hospitalization 
No surgery 
Severe pain for a few hours 
 
Recovery/ 
Life expectancy 
Do not recover 
Die at 84 instead of 88 
 
Do not recover 
Die suddenly at 67 instead of 88 
 
Risk Reduction 
10% 
From 10 in 1,000 to 9 in 1,000 
 
10% 
From 40 in 1,000 to 36 in 1,000 
 
Costs to you 
$12 per month 
[ = $144 per year] 
 
$17 per month 
[ = $204 per year] 
 
Your choice 
 
Reduce my 
chance of  
diabetes 
 
Reduce my 
chance of 
heart attack 
 
 
Neither 
Program 
 
 
tests that one might consider. Thus we abandon formal design criteria and resort to 
randomized assignments of attribute levels, subject to plausibility constraints determined by 
the specific illness label. 
Each choice exercise is followed immediately by a set of debriefing questions designed 
to help the researcher understand the individual’s reasons for their particular choice. Some 
debriefing questions depend on the alternative chosen by the respondent. For example, there 
are various perfectly legitimate economic reasons why individuals may prefer the status 
quo—including that they cannot afford either of the risk-reduction programs which are 
described, they would rather spend money on other things, or they believe they will be 
affected by another illness before they contract either illness stated in the scenario. If 
respondents choose the status quo, they are asked why ―Neither Program‖ is their preferred 
                                                 
10
 A table like this one is displayed only after 24 screens of preparation, including an extensive 
tutorial that unfolds the information in each row of the summary choice table, one attribute at a time. 
The tutorial includes instructions about how to interpret the information and skill-testing questions to 
assess the respondent’s understanding of key points. The tutorial makes use of the same data that will 
appear in the individual’s first choice set. Subsequent choice sets are presented as summary tables 
only. 
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alternative. Included among these possible reasons are some that reveal the presence of 
scenario rejection, such as ―I did not believe the programs would work.‖ 
Other debriefing questions are asked regardless of which alternative the individual 
selects.
 
The key question for this paper is shown in Figure 2:  ―Around when do you think 
you would begin to value highly the risk reduction benefits of each program?‖  We interpret 
this question as being equivalent to the question ―When do you think the program’s benefits 
will start?‖ The benefit of the program is clearly defined on an earlier page of the survey as 
a reduction in the risk of suffering from the specified major illness or injury starting at the 
age stated in the scenario. If the respondent fully accepts the stated scenario, then the age at 
which the scenario states the benefits start should match the age at which the respondent 
believes the benefits will start. 
Module 4 of the survey contains additional debriefing questions which permit 
validation of other dimensions of the individual’s responses. Module 5 is collected 
separately from the survey and contains the respondent’s sociodemographic characteristics 
and a detailed medical history, including which major diseases the individual has already 
faced. 
 
Figure 2 – Example of debriefing question for scenario adjustment 
You may have chosen Program A, Program B, or neither. Regardless of your 
choice, we would like to know when, over your lifetime, you think you would 
first need and benefit from the two programs (if at all).  
Your answers below may depend upon the illness or injury in question, as well 
as your current age, health and family history.  
Around when do you think you would begin to value highly the risk reduction 
benefits of each program?  
Select one answer from each column in the grid 
 
Program A  
to reduce my chance 
of diabetes 
Program B  
to reduce my chance 
of heart attack 
For me, benefits would start:   
Immediately   
1-5 years from now   
6-10 years from now   
11-20 years from now   
21-30 years from now   
31 or more years from now   
Never (Program would not  
benefit me)   
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4 A Random Utility Choice Model 
 
This paper is based on an empirical specification that is similar, although not identical, to 
that used in Cameron and DeShazo (2009). In that paper, it is established that stated choices 
appear to be best predicted by a model that involves discounted expected utility from 
durations in different types of future health states. Indirect utility is also modeled as 
additively separable, but non-linear, in present discounted expected net income, where net 
income is just 
iY  if ―Neither Program‖ is selected, but it is 
j
i iY c  if a program is chosen for 
which the annual cost is 
j
ic . If utility is modeled as a monotonic function of net income, 
 if Y , the most basic specification is a four-parameter model.
11
 
To understand the model, consider just the pair-wise choice between Program A and 
the status quo alternative (N).
12
  Define the discount rate as r  and let the discount factor be 
 1
tt r

  . Let 
NS
i  be the probability of individual i  suffering the adverse health profile 
(i.e. getting ―sick‖) if the status quo alternative (i.e. neither program) is selected, and let ASi  
be the reduced probability of suffering the adverse health profile if Program A is chosen. 
The difference between 
NS
i  and  
AS
i  is 
A
i , which is the (negative) risk change to be 
achieved by Program A. We assume that individuals do not expect to pay the annual cost of 
the risk reduction program if they are sick or dead.  
The sequence of health states that makes up an illness profile is captured by a set of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive (0, 1) indicator variables associated with each future time 
period t . These are defined as 1( - )Aitpre illness  for pre-illness years, assumed to be 
equivalent to the health state under the status quo alternative. The sequence of adverse 
health states for which Program A reduces the risk are indicated by 1( )Aitillness  for illness-
years, 1( )Aitrecovered  for recovered or post-illness years, and 1(  - )
A
itlost life year  for life-years 
lost. The present discounted remainder of the individual’s nominal life expectancy, iT , is 
given by 
1
iTA t
i t
pdvc 

 . Other relevant discounted spells, also summed from 1t   to 
it T  include  1 -A t Ai itpdve pre illness ,  1A t Ai itpdvi illness , Aipdvr   
 1t Aitrecovered , and  1  -A t Ai itpdvl lost life year . Since the different health states 
exhaust the individual’s nominal life expectancy, A A A A A
i i i i ipdve pdvi pdvr pdvl pdvc    . 
Finally, to accommodate the fact that the individuals expect to pay program costs only 
during the pre-illness or recovered post-illness periods, we define the discounted payment 
period as A A A
i i ipdvp pdve pdvr  . 
 To further simplify notation, let  1A AS A AS Ai i i i icterm pdvc pdvp       and let 
A A AS A NS A
i i i i i iyterm pdvc pdvi pdvl       . Adapting the model in Cameron and DeShazo 
(2009), the expected utility-difference that drives the individual’s choice between Program 
A and the status quo can then be specified as follows, where the expectation is taken across 
the sick (S) and healthy (H) outcomes: 
 
                                                 
11
 The remainder of this section consists of an abbreviated version of the reasoning described in 
Cameron and DeShazo (2009) and Appendix E associated with that paper (Model, Estimation and 
Alternative Analyses). 
12
 There is an analogous choice between Program B and the status quo alternative.  
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      
     
,
1 2 3        + +
A A A A
S H i i i i i i
AS A AS A AS A A
i i i i i i i
E PDV V f Y c cterm f Y yterm
pdvi pdvr pdvl      
    
 
    
 (1) 
 
The four terms in braces can be constructed from the data, given specific assumptions about 
the discount rate.
13
 
In the sense of Graham (1981), the ―option price‖ for Program A is defined as the 
maximum common certain payment that makes the individual just indifferent between 
paying for the program and enjoying the risk reduction, or not paying for the program and 
not enjoying the risk reduction. If we let 
A
ipterm  denote the set of three terms in equation 
(1) involving Aipdvi , 
A
ipdvr  and 
A
ipdvl , the annual option price ˆ
A
ic  that makes the 
expression in equation (1) exactly equal to zero can be calculated as: 
 
 1ˆ
A A A
i i i iA
i i A
i
f Y yterm pterm
c Y f
cterm


  
     
 (2) 
 
Where  f Y  will be specified as a scaled version of a Box-Cox transformation, for the 
models described in the body of this paper:    1f Y Y    , where   is the fourth 
parameter to be estimated (along with 1 , 2  and 3 ).  This transformation can subsume 
linear, logarithmic, and square root transformations. However, to keep the estimation 
manageable using available algorithms, we will here assume that 0.42  , a value close to 
a square-root transformation, determined by a line-search across possible values of the Box-
Cox parameter.
14
 In online Appendix B, we also consider a specification where 
  20 1 0 1( ) i i i if Y Y Y Y Y       , so that  
1f    is the solution to a quadratic form.  
Next, the expected present value of this stream of payments must be calculated over the 
individual’s remaining nominal lifespan: 
 
 , ˆ ˆA A AS H i i iE PV c cterm c         (3) 
 
And finally, we need to convert this expected present-value option price into a measure that 
Cameron and DeShazo (2009) call the ―willingness to pay for a microrisk reduction‖: 
 WTP r .15 We normalize the measure in equation (3), arbitrarily, on a 610  risk change 
by dividing the result in equation (3) by the absolute size of the risk reduction specified for 
the program in question, and then further dividing by one million, to produce: 
                                                 
13
 In this paper, we assume a common discount rate of five percent. In Cameron and DeShazo (2009), 
the consequences of assuming either a three percent discount rate or a seven percent discount rate are 
explored. The order of discounting and the expectations operator can be reversed because health 
status and net income are assumed to be constant within each of the time intervals involved. 
14
 To estimate the Box-Cox parameter  simultaneously would require adaptation of the algorithm by 
Train (2006) to handle non-linear-in-parameters utility index functions.  Such a model would be 
interesting, but the results of the present paper appear very robust with respect to a variety of different 
approximations to the true underlying relationship between utility and net income, so we opt for this 
simpler alternative. 
15
 Cameron (2010) makes the argument that it would be safer yet to refer to this as ―willingness to 
swap other goods and services for a microrisk reduction‖ for the specified health threat. 
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    6, ˆ 10A AS H i iiWTP r E PV c 
   
   
 (4) 
 
The  WTP r depends upon the entire illness profile and all of the parameters in equation 
(1). The value of one million microrisk reductions is the closest counterpart, in this model, 
to the conventional idea of the ―value of a statistical life‖ (VSL) employed in the mortality 
risk valuation literature, as discussed (for example) in the meta-analysis by Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003). This normalized  WTP r can be used to compare the relative magnitudes of 
willingness to pay for health risk reductions for differing age groups and illness profiles.
16
     
Cameron and DeShazo (2009) determine, however, that the simple model in equation 
(1) is dominated by a specification that is not merely linear in the terms involving present 
discounted health-state years. First, we factor out the probability differences in the illness 
profile terms in equation (1) as follows. 
 
     1 2 3
1 2 3
+ +
     
A AS A AS A AS A
i i i i i i i
AS A A A
i i i i
pterm pdvi pdvr pdvl
pdvi pdvr pdvl
     
   
   
      .
 
 
Then we note that this simple linear specification does not explain respondents’ observed 
choices as successfully as a model that employs shifted logarithms of the 
j
ipdvX  terms 
(where , ,X i r l .). A form that is fully translog (including all squares and pair-wise 
interaction terms for the three log terms) has been considered, and two of the higher-order 
terms bear statistically significant coefficients in a conventional conditional logit 
specification. If we retain only those terms for which the coefficients are statistically 
different from zero, this final term becomes: 
 
     
       
1 2 3
2
4 5
log 1 log 1 log 1
log 1 log 1 log 1
A A A
i i i
AS
i
A A A
i i i
pdvi pdvr pdvl
pdvl pdvi pdvl
  

 
     
 
       
 (5) 
 
The opportunity for longer durations in each health state is correlated with the youth of the 
respondent. Thus, it is also important to allow the   coefficients to differ systematically 
with the respondent’s current age wherever this generalization is warranted by the data. This 
leads to a model where 2
3 30 31 31i iage age      , and analogously for 4  and 5 . This 
quadratic-in-age systematic variation in parameters permits non-constant age profiles for the 
rWTP estimates from this model, and the data tend to produce the usual higher values 
during middle age and lower values for younger and older respondents. 
In this paper, two other parameters will be estimated. First, it is possible that Program 
A and Program B may convey systematically greater or lesser utility than the status quo 
alternative, regardless of the attributes of either program. To accommodate this possibility 
                                                 
16
 For readers who may be less familiar with the literature on VSLs, we emphasize that a VSL is 
definitely not a measure of willingness to pay to avoid empirically relevant sizes of risk reductions, 
such as the modest reductions, in already-small risks, achieved by many incremental modern 
environmental, health, or safety regulations. The typical risk reduction is vastly smaller than the 1.00 
(aggregate) risk reduction used for the normalization involved in a VSL estimate. 
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we will include an indicator variable for  1 jiAny Program  which takes a value of one for 
either program and a value of zero for the status quo alternative. The coefficient  on this 
variable can capture things such as payment vehicle rejection or yea-saying. We wish to 
measure the marginal rates of substitution between risk changes and income, so we will net 
out any estimated non-status-quo effects in our  WTP r calculations. 
The final parameter to be estimated is the dispersion of an error component in the 
utility function associated with either program alternative but not the status quo. This 
generalization was first proposed by Scarpa et al. (2005), and has been found to be relevant 
by Campbell (2007), Hess and Rose (2009) and Hu et al. (2009). This model can be 
estimated conveniently by using the mixed logit algorithm offered by Train (2006) and 
specifying a zero-mean but normally distributed coefficient on an indicator variable 
associated with either of the program alternatives.  In the presence of the ordinary 
coefficient on the 
j
iAny Program  indicator, however, this model is equivalent to a 
specification with simply a random coefficient on the indicator variable shared by the two 
program alternatives.
17
 
In the next section, we discuss how we extend this empirical specification to detect, and 
potentially correct for, scenario adjustment. 
   
5 Controlling for Scenario Adjustment 
 
Recall that after each choice scenario, respondents are asked debriefing questions about 
when they believe that the benefits of each proposed program would begin—for them 
personally. Based on the answers to each of the questions in Figure 2, we define two 
variables. First, 1( )jinever  is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the individual 
responds by checking ―Never (Program would not benefit me).‖ Our second variable, 
j
ioverest , is an approximately continuous variable defined as the ―minimum overestimate of 
the latency,‖ which measures the disparity between the individual’s subjective latency and 
the latency stated in the choice scenario on the survey.  
The variable 
j
ioverest  requires a more detailed explanation. If the interval checked in 
the question in Figure 2 contains the stated latency for the illness from the corresponding 
choice scenario, then 
j
ioverest  = 0. The relationship between the chosen interval and the 
stated latency is thus something like that shown in Part A of Figure 3. In this case, the time 
when benefits begin (in the opinion of the respondent) is essentially the same as the latency 
stated in the choice scenario. In contrast, 
j
ioverest  has a positive value equal to the 
difference between the lower bound of the checked time interval and the stated latency if 
that checked interval lies entirely above the stated latency for that illness in the choice 
scenario, like the outcome shown in Part B of Figure 3. If the checked interval lies entirely 
                                                 
17
 One final incidental parameter is also featured in these models. It accommodates a correction for 
sample representativeness. Cameron and DeShazo (2009), in Appendix D, estimate the determinants 
of membership in the estimating sample, relative to the original half-million general population panel 
recruitment contacts by Knowledge Networks, Inc. These models permit construction of fitted 
response probabilities for each consumer in the estimating sample. These response probabilities can 
be expressed as deviations from the central tendency in response probabilities across the recruitment 
pool. Only the coefficient on the term in discounted illness-years is shifted to a statistically significant 
extent when the subject’s response probability deviates from the average. Thus the model includes a 
shift variable on that coefficient which employs    log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi         . 
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Figure 3: Examples of overest  calculations: different stated latencies, but 
respondent chooses ―11-20 years‖ in the debriefing question 
 
 
 below the stated latency, as illustrated in Part C of Figure 3, 
j
ioverest  has a negative value 
equal to the difference between the upper bound of the checked interval and the stated 
latency.
18
  
The usual intent within a stated preference study is to induce individuals to accept the 
stated choice scenario as fully as possible and for them to respond conditional on that 
acceptance. If respondents selectively reinterpret the question (i.e. adjust the choice 
scenario) before they answer, then this violates an important maintained hypothesis behind 
the random utility model that produces the utility parameter estimates which are the 
foundation of most stated preference studies. We thus use the ―observed‖ values of 
1( )jinever  and 
j
ioverest  constructed from the debriefing questions associated with each of 
the 15,040 illness profiles presented to our respondents to control and correct for scenario 
adjustment with respect to the latency attribute. Descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in these models are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 In Appendix A to this paper, available from the authors, we explore the relationships between each 
of our two scenario adjustment variables and an array of explanatory variables specific either to the 
individual or to the choice scenario. In the body of the paper, however, we use the observed values of 
these variables, rather than fitted values.  
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics (n = 15040 illness profiles 
 and associated risk reduction programs) 
 Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
Program attributes     
  Monthly program cost ($) 29.9 28.7 2 140 
  j
i = Risk change achieved by program -.00341 .00167 -.006 -.001 
Stated Illness profiles     
  Latency (in years, stated in scenario) 19.6 12.0 1 60 
  -  1( )jinever  (―Program will never benefit me‖) .0769    
  -  j
ioverest  (minimum overest. of latency) -7.47 12.0 -59 29 
  Sick years (undiscounted) 6.50 7.17 0 52 
     j
ipdvi = Present value of sick-years 2.21 2.51 0 16.3 
  Recovered years (undiscounted) 26.1 13.0 0 64 
     j
ipdvr = Present value of recovered years .477 1.37 0 15.9 
  Lost life-years (undiscounted) 10.8 10.3 0 55 
     j
ipdvl = Present value of lost life-years 2.57 2.93 0 17.8 
Attributes of individuals     
  Annual income (in $10,000) 5.09 3.41 0.5 15.0 
  Age at time of choice 50.4 15.1 25 93 
Systematic selection from RDD contacts     
  ( )iP sel P = Difference between fitted  
   response/nonresponse and population average 
.677 3.36 -.316 17.9 
 
We accommodate scenario adjustment by allowing each of the utility parameters in our 
baseline model to differ systematically with individuals’ responses to the debriefing 
questions about whether and when the benefits from each health-risk reduction program are 
likely to be realized. The complete version of the model without scenario adjustments 
involves a total of thirteen basic utility parameters—   which contributes to the marginal 
utility of net income (i.e. expenditure on all other goods and services), the five basic   
parameters ( 1 2 3 4 5, , , ,     ) appearing in the illness profile term in expression (5) above, 
plus the three pairs of coefficients on the iage  and 
2
iage  terms introduced to shift the basic 
parameters 3 , 4  and 5 , and the single coefficient, 13 , that shifts the coefficient on the 
sick-years term according to the deviation in the fitted sample-participation probability for 
that individual. (We treat the random coefficient on the j
iAny Program  as an incidental 
parameter.) 
To effect corrections for scenario adjustment, our two scenario-adjustment variables, 
1( )jinever  and 
j
ioverest , are initially allowed to shift every one of the basic utility 
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parameters. If we represent each of these parameters generically as  , the new model 
substitutes a systematically varying parameter as follows: 
19
 
 
 0 1 21( )
j j
i inever overest        (6) 
There are thus three times as many parameters in the fully generalized specification.
20
  In 
Table 2, however, we report results for a parsimonious version that retains only those shift 
variables for scenario adjustment which are individually statistically significant.
21
 
Model 1 in Table 2 gives the utility parameter estimates which result when the 
possibility of scenario adjustment is completely ignored during estimation. Model 2 in the 
same table (which actually spans columns 2 through 4) reveals the results when scenario 
adjustment is accommodated. The ideal situation (i.e. full acceptance of the stated latency of 
benefits) corresponds to 1( ) 0jinever   and 0
j
ioverest   for all respondents and all 
programs. We thus label the first column of parameters for Model 2 as ―Corrected,‖ since 
these are the estimated utility parameters which would apply when 1( )jinever  and 
j
ioverest
are both set equal to zero—i.e. when we simulate counterfactually the latency scenarios that 
the survey had intended each respondent to accept.  
In Model 2, where we measure and correct for scenario adjustment, the magnitudes of 
some of the shift parameters are striking. The second column of results for Model 2 shows 
the significant shifts in each of these utility parameters when the respondent states that they 
will never benefit from the program in question. The third column shows the significant 
shifts in these parameters for a one-unit increase in 
j
ioverest .  Differences in the coefficient 
on the net income variable are particularly important. The marginal utility of income derived 
from Model 2 serves as the denominator in the calculation of the marginal rate of 
substitution (between each illness profile attribute and income) that gives the estimated 
marginal willingness to pay associated with each attribute. Overestimation of the latency 
appears to be associated with a higher estimated marginal utility of income, which means a 
lower WTP.  
There are also a number of important differences for ―scenario adjusters‖ among the 
coefficients on the illness profile terms. In one case (for the linear term in the shifted log of 
discounted sick years), the discrete shift in the parameter associated with the perception that 
the program will never provide any benefit is sufficient to completely change the sign of the 
effect. In another case (for the coefficient on the squared term in discounted lost life-years), 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 In a set of preliminary models, we employed both 1( )jinever  and a pair of indicator variables for 
over- or underestimation (relative to none) to shift each of the   parameters in the general model. 
The results were qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
20
 Results for a fully generalized 52-parameter model and a more-parsimonious version, using a 
specification that is quadratic in net income, are contained in online Appendix B. 
21
 We acknowledge that these variables may be, to some extent, jointly endogenous with the 
underlying willingness to pay for health risk reductions because they are reported by the same 
individuals. In Appendix A, available from the authors, we note that despite the considerable number 
of statistically significant coefficients in our models to explain j
ioverest , we are only able to explain 
(at best) about 35 percent of its variation across illness profiles using the large number of explanatory 
variables we have available.  
Cameron, T. A., J. R. DeShazo and E. H. Johnson, Journal of Choice Modelling, 4(1), pp. 9-43   
 
24 
 
Table 2: Policy choice model; parsimonious; 1801 respondents, 7520 choices
a 
(Parameter) Constructed Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 cterm, yterm=net income pattern (see text) 
 pdv = present discounted years of : 
   i = illness, r=recovery, l=lost life 
Uncorrected 
Coef. 
Corrected 
Coef. a 
 1( )jinever   
j
ioverest  
   
 
 
 0.42 0.42
0
j j j
i i i i iY c cterm Y yterm
  
  
 
0.0127 0.0224 -0.0121      0.000540      
(6.78)*** (8.59)*** (-1.51) (3.21)*** 
   10 log 1jS ji ipdvi    
-38.0 -46.5 390.     8.16      
(-3.77)*** (-3.64)*** (5.93)*** (7.57)*** 
   11 ( ) log 1jS ji i iP sel P pdvi           
4.96 5.42      - - 
(2.77)*** (2.69)***   
   2 log 1jS ji ipdvr    
-14.4 -55.5     - - 
(-1.41) (-4.95)***   
   30 log 1jS ji ipdvl    
-372. -620.    - 5.01      
(-1.86)* (-2.73)***  (3.54)*** 
         31 0 log 1jS ji i iage pdvl    
15.9 37.1      - - 
(1.96)** (4.09)***   
         232 0 log 1jS ji i iage pdvl    
-0.171 -0.323      - 0.00761      
(-2.19)** (-3.75)***  (7.86)*** 
   
2
40 log 1
jS j
i ipdvl       
142. 218.    509.    - 
(1.51) (2.05)** (4.78)***  
         
2
41 0 log 1
jS j
i i iage pdvl       
-6.76 -14.2      -6.13      - 
(-1.77)* (-3.33)*** 
 
(-3.70)***  
         
2
2
42 0 log 1
jS j
i i iage pdvl       
0.0741 0.124      - -0.00182      
(2.01)** (3.02)***  (-4.08)*** 
      
   
 
50 log 1
               log 1
jS j
i i
j
i
pdvi
pdvl
     
   
 
-
b -b -535.    -4.76      
  
(-4.78)*** (-3.90)*** 
      
   
 
51 0 log 1
                          log 1
jS j
i i i
j
i
age pdvi
pdvl
    
 
  
 
 
-0.834 -2.20      - - 
(-1.43) (-3.10)***   
      
   
 
2
52 0 log 1
                          log 1
jS j
i i i
j
i
age pdvi
pdvl
    
 
  
 
 
0.0233 0.0213      0.0979      - 
(2.57)** (1.93)* (3.66)***  
    jiAny Program  0.877 0.833        
(9.06)*** (8.75)***   
 . c  (  )
j
iVar omponent Any Program  2.97 2.85        
(25.31)*** (25.35)***   
Log L -7139.972 -6536.916 
a 
Estimated using an adaptation of the MXLMSL program provided by Train (2006).
  
b 
Baseline for this interaction term is suppressed because the t-test statistic is only 1.04 in the uncorrected model 
and only 0.02 in the corrected model. 
the sign of the coefficient remains the same but the coefficient more than triples in size. In a 
third case (for the baseline interaction term involving discounted sick-years and discounted 
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lost life-years), a coefficient that otherwise appears to be zero is rendered large and strongly 
statistically significant for respondents who state that the program will never provide them 
any benefit.  For all of the illness profile terms, whenever the coefficients on the interaction 
terms involving 
j
ioverest  are statistically significant, they bear a sign that is opposite to the 
baseline coefficient on the same term. Scenario adjustments can thus have a clearly 
discernible impact upon estimated marginal utilities. 
The magnitudes of the shift parameters reported for Model 2 in Table 2 appear fairly 
large, individually. However, to appreciate the overall effects of these parameter changes on 
demand estimates, it is necessary to simulate distributions for the implied (normalized) 
willingness-to-pay estimates. Bear in mind that the U.S. EPA, for example, relies upon an 
overall average value of a statistical life (a VSL associated with sudden death in the current 
period) of about $6-$7 million, whereas for transportation policies, the VSL numbers 
typically used have historically been closer to $3-$4 million, although they have been 
revised upward somewhat in recent years. In Table 3, we show selected  WTP r estimates 
for specified individuals and illness profiles. These estimates are based on 1000 draws from 
the asymptotic joint distribution of the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and are not 
sign-constrained.  Draws which produce negative estimates are interpreted as zero in the 
calculation of the means in Table 3, but the 90% range includes these negative calculated 
values. We consider, in succession, an individual who is 30, 45, or 60 years old. In all cases, 
the individual earns an income of $42,000 per year. The illness profiles involve shorter (and 
longer) illnesses with recovery, shorter (and longer) illnesses followed by death, and sudden 
death with no preceding period of illness. The ―sudden death‖  WTP r estimates, when 
multiplied by one million, are the measures from our study which are the most comparable 
to conventional VSL estimates.
22
   
Scenario adjustment in the context of this illustration concerns illness latency, so two 
different latency periods are considered. In the first pair of columns in Table 3, we specify 
that each illness commences immediately (i.e. with no latency period). In the second pair, 
we specify a latency period of twenty years. In each pair of columns, the initial 
―uncorrected‖  WTP r  estimates are calculated from the uncorrected parameters of Model 
1 in Table 2. The ―corrected‖ numbers are calculated using the baseline coefficients from 
Model 2 in Table 2, which net out the effects of any scenario adjustments reported by 
respondents.  
Table 3 shows that for the ―No Latency‖ illness profiles, the corrected
 
estimates are 
mostly higher than those produced by a model that does not take scenario adjustment into 
account. The most dramatic differences are for and the five-year fatal illness for 60-year-
olds, where the uncorrected model suggests a  WTP r  of less than $1, whereas the 
corrected estimate is $9.91. (The only exceptions, where for sixty-year-olds  the corrected 
estimates are lower than the uncorrected estimates, are for the illnesses which are not fatal. 
The most typical differences between the corrected and uncorrected  WTP r  estimates 
suggests that if scenario adjustment is not taken into account, willingness to pay estimates 
                                                 
22
 The illnesses described in our choice scenarios are all major illnesses, including most of the 
afflictions from which people eventually die. It is likely that people do not assume that their health 
status ―after‖ one of these illnesses, should they recover, will be equivalent to their pre-illness state. 
Thus the value of avoiding a one-year major illness includes the value of avoiding the ensuing post-
illness health state. It will not be the same as the value of avoiding just that year of illness, separate 
from any ensuing years in an incompletely recovered state. 
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Table 3:  WTP for microrisk reduction; mean (negative values set to zero), 5
th
, 95
th
 percentiles
a
  
Without and with correction for scenario adjustment w.r.t. latency (Income = $42,000) 
  No latency
b Latency of 20 yrs 
Age Illness profile Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
30 1 year sick, recover $ 2.69 
[0.71, 4.74] 
$ 4.02 
[2.75, 5.29] 
$ 1.60 
[0.33, 2.92] 
$ 2.39 
[1.56, 3.22] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 4.03 
[2.07, 6.21] 
4.83 
[3.55, 6.12] 
2.44 
[1.23, 3.75] 
2.83 
[2.07, 3.61] 
 1 year sick, then die 6.76 
[2.99, 10.73] 
10.06 
[7.26, 12.95] 
3.90 
[2.30, 5.79] 
1.01 
[-0.08, 2.10] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 8.22 
[4.42, 12.17] 
11.92 
[9.25, 15.04] 
4.71 
[3.16, 6.72] 
1.95 
[0.98, 3.05] 
 Sudden death 5.54 
[1.36, 9.69] 
7.82 
[5.22, 10.69] 
3.43 
[1.74, 5.38] 
0.47 
[-0.95, 1.52] 
45 1 year sick, recover 2.53 
[0.62, 4.51] 
3.28 
[2.06, 4.44] 
1.38 
[0.23, 2.54] 
1.45 
[0.75, 2.14] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.80 
[1.93, 5.89] 
4.16 
[2.97, 5.29] 
2.15 
[1.12, 3.3] 
1.88 
[1.21, 2.49] 
 1 year sick, then die 6.25 
[3.85, 8.95] 
10.98 
[8.88, 13.58] 
2.31 
[1.3, 3.48] 
0 
[-3.35, -1.27] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 5.88 
[3.39, 8.93] 
12.19 
[9.81, 15.2] 
2.39 
[1.44, 3.40] 
0 
[-2.39, -0.69] 
 Sudden death 6.19 
[3.66, 8.94] 
8.69 
[6.88, 10.99] 
2.21 
[1.05, 3.61] 
0 
[-4.14, -1.75] 
60 1 year sick, recover 2.55 
[0.68, 4.48] 
2.37 
[1.21, 3.47] 
1.31 
[0.37, 2.27] 
0.18 
[-0.51, 0.63] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.58 
[1.82, 5.54] 
3.31 
[2.18, 4.38] 
1.83 
[1.09, 2.64] 
0.38 
[-0.16, 0.83] 
 1 year sick, then die 2.60 
[0.34, 4.77] 
9.31 
[7.45, 11.49] 
1.61 
[0.37, 2.79] 
0 
[-6.33, -3.17] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 0.78 
[-1.83, 2.65] 
9.91 
[7.90, 12.44] 
1.39 
[0.34, 2.39] 
0 
[-4.73, -2.23] 
 Sudden death 4.18 
[1.73, 6.65] 
7.24 
[5.55, 9.20] 
1.82 
[0.48, 3.10] 
0 
[-7.10, -3.65] 
a
 Intervals not censored at zero. Distribution based on 1000 random draws from the joint distribution of 
the estimated parameters. 
b
 Minimum latency in the choice scenarios was one year. These values are thus extrapolated out of 
sample, based upon the fitted model.  
 
for many illness profiles of this type may be biased downward. This type of bias may result 
in the recommendation that some programs or policies that reduce illnesses and injuries with 
no latency (i.e. where benefits start immediately) should not be implemented when it may 
actually be welfare-increasing to put these measures into effect.  
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In contrast, the corrected estimates for illness profiles that have a latency of 20 years 
are predominantly lower than the uncorrected estimates. Furthermore, the 90% simulated 
distributions for these  WTP r measures often include negative values. The only two 
anomalies—where the corrected estimates are higher—are for the non-fatal illness profiles 
for 30-year-olds. This evidence suggests that failure to take into account scenario adjustment 
could cause some programs or policies that address long-latency health risks to be 
implemented when they are not actually welfare-enhancing from the current perspective of 
most age groups. These differences in the corrected and uncorrected  WTP r  estimates 
show just how important it may be to acknowledge and possibly to correct for scenario 
adjustments in stated preference research. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The absence of suitable market data sometimes forces researchers to use stated preference 
methods to assess demand for fundamentally non-market (or pre-test-market) goods or 
services. Given economists’ skepticism about the reliability of stated preference data, 
researchers in fields where this type of data must be used have systematically addressed 
many recognized problems with these alternative demand-measurement methodologies. One 
problem with SP research has been the occurrence of protest responses or scenario rejection, 
where respondents completely refuse to play along with the hypothetical choice exercise 
because they do not believe (or agree with) some aspect of the choice scenario. This paper 
addresses the related but potentially more subtle problem of scenario adjustment. 
Respondents do make the stated choices requested of them, but they first implicitly revise 
the choice scenario to better capture what would be the implications of each alternative in 
their own particular case. 
Scenario adjustment may be more likely in situations where the alternatives involved in 
the choice problem are less easy to perceive and appreciate. For example, it may be possible 
to describe, unambiguously, the relevant attributes of alternative brands of dishwashing 
soap, in which case scenario adjustment would be unlikely. In contrast, it may be very 
difficult to completely describe the relevant attributes of a program to enhance the survival 
of an endangered species, where even the experts cannot predict for certain whether the 
program will be effective. Choices that involve heterogeneous risks or uncertain outcomes, 
such as the reduction of health risks, may be the most vulnerable to scenario adjustment, 
since there is great variability in how different people perceive risks and uncertainty.  
Assessment and correction for scenario adjustment is easier and can be more systematic 
if the survey poses suitable debriefing questions about each key element of the choice 
scenarios. The specific debriefing question used in our empirical illustration in this paper is 
very useful, but it may still have been less than ideal. Carefully planned questions of this 
type, however, can help the researcher identify those individuals who acknowledge that they 
do not believe that the preceding choice scenario, exactly as stated, applies to them. Where 
possible, debriefing questions can also be used to quantify the likely extent to which 
individuals may have adjusted the scenario. With information about the extent of scenario 
adjustments, researchers can explicitly model the effects of scenario adjustment on the 
estimated utility parameters in their choice models. This allows counterfactual simulations 
of the individual’s most likely response, had they answered the question exactly as it was 
asked. These types of simulations, with systematic correction for scenario adjustment, 
presumably permit more accurate estimates of demand.  
The data used in this study suggest that some individuals may indeed adjust some 
aspects of choice scenarios so that these scenarios better apply to their own personal 
situations. We use an empirical choice model that allows our utility parameter estimates to 
Cameron, T. A., J. R. DeShazo and E. H. Johnson, Journal of Choice Modelling, 4(1), pp. 9-43   
 
28 
 
differ systematically according to the respondent’s own reports of possible scenario 
adjustment with respect to latency periods. Our estimation results show that our 
counterfactually simulated WTP-type benefits estimates—corrected for scenario 
adjustment—are often noticeably different from the uncorrected estimates. For example, our 
empirical estimates suggest that after correction for scenario adjustments, programs that 
benefit people now have mainly higher estimates, while programs that benefit people twenty 
years into the future have mainly lower estimates. These differences in estimated demands 
are big enough that they could potentially make the difference between enacting a policy 
that is warranted on a benefit-cost criterion and failing to enact it.  
Given our findings and the differences in demand estimates (with and without 
correction) in this illustration, we infer that scenario adjustment is likely to be inevitable and 
potentially influential, at least in some proportion of cases, in many other applications as 
well. Debriefing questions to permit assessment and correction of scenario adjustment 
should probably be a regular feature of SP surveys. Likewise, formal modeling of scenario 
adjustment and its impact on the final estimates of interest should probably be a routine 
component of sensitivity analysis in empirical work using stated preferences. Researchers 
should at least report the extent to which their main results may be affected by this type of 
correction. Such information would allow the policy-makers to decide which types of 
―misalignments‖ between respondent and researcher information sets warrant correction, 
and therefore which demand estimates should be preferred. 
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APPENDIX A 
In this Appendix, we carefully consider the empirical correlates of our two scenario 
adjustment indicators. Table A-1 gives descriptive statistics for these variables and a set of 
regressors we used to explain systematic variations in their magnitudes. First, we use a 
simple binary logit model to examine how the value of the indicator variable 1( )jinever can 
be explained by a wide variety of (a) characteristics of the respondent, and (b) attributes of 
the health risk targeted by each program. Each respondent considers ten different health 
risk-reduction programs, in five sets of two, with each choice set including the status quo as 
a third alternative. In total, therefore, 15,040 substantive illness profiles and health-risk 
reduction programs are considered in the 7,520 choice scenarios analyzed in this paper. For 
1,156 (7.69%) of these illness profiles, respondents indicated their belief that they would 
never benefit from the risk-reduction program.  
Models 1 and 2 in Table A-2 are ad hoc binary logit models to explain these 7.69% of 
cases where 1( )jinever =1. Missing data for some of the explanatory variables used in these 
preliminary exploratory models accounts for the reduction of the number of illness profiles 
from 15,040 to 13,626. The logit specification suggests that people are more likely to say 
that a particular program will never benefit them if they are female, if they currently have a 
larger number of other illnesses, if they feel at greater subjective risk for getting other 
illnesses, if they are a member of a larger household, or if they are a single parent. People 
are less likely to say the program will never benefit them if they are presented with an 
illness profile that includes long-term pain and/or disability, if they have not attended 
college, if they acknowledge a higher subjective risk of getting this disease, if they have (on 
average) more room to improve their health habits, and if they currently have children in 
their household. 
Now we explore the determinants of our approximately continuous measure of the 
―minimum overestimate of the latency,‖ in this case using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model. The 
j
ioverest  for a program is known only if the individual does not state that they 
expect never to benefit from the program (i.e. if 1( ) 0jinever  ). Thus, we have a maximum 
of 15,040 – 1,156 = 13,884 potential observations on the 
j
ioverest  variable. For many 
respondents and many programs, the interval during which the individual personally expects 
the benefits of the program to begin spans the onset time specified in the illness profile. For 
these individuals and programs, 0jioverest  , signaling minimal scenario adjustment with 
respect to the latency period. This happens for 4,133 of the 13,884 programs for which 
j
ioverest  information is available. Latency is overestimated to some degree for 1,542 
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programs, and underestimated for 8,209 programs. The mean value of 
j
ioverest  is -7.57 
(with a minimum of -59 and a maximum of 29).
23
  
Models 1 through 5 in Table A-3 demonstrate the significant determinants of 
j
ioverest  
across a variety of alternative specifications. Missing data for some of the regressors again 
reduces the estimating sample, this time from 13,884 to 12,596 illness profiles. The 
coefficients on age and age-squared are highly significant in the first two models when 
latency variables for the specified illness profiles are left out of the model. When latency 
variables are included (as in Models 3 through 5), the coefficients on the age variables are 
no longer statistically significant. It is likely that latency effects are captured by the age 
variables in the first two models. The insignificant age terms are dropped from the 
specification in Model 4.  
Model 5 demonstrates the consequences of using an interval-data model rather than 
treating 
j
ioverest  as an approximately continuous variable. As is clear from in Figure 2, 
respondents were asked to specify the future time interval when their benefits would start, 
and Model 5 more explicitly captures the interval nature of these data. However, the 
estimates produced by Models 4 and 5 are very similar. The only notable difference is that 
the estimated coefficient on the respondent’s subjective risk of suffering other illnesses 
becomes statistically insignificant in Model 5 (although the point estimate remains similar). 
Models 4 and 5 suggest that individuals are more likely to overestimate the latency 
period when they consider an illness profile with a longer period of pain or disability, if the 
illness profile has pain/disability lasting more than 60 months, if they feel at greater 
subjective risk for other illnesses, if they belong to a two-income household, or if they will 
have a child under the age of eighteen in the household at the time of the stated onset of the 
disease. Individuals are more likely to assume that the latency in their own case will be less 
than the stated latency in the survey if they have not attended college, if they already have 
the illness in question, if they have a larger number of other major illnesses, if they feel at a 
higher subjective risk for this illness, if they have (on average) more room to improve their 
health habits, or if they have children or are single parents. The length of the latency period 
stated in the illness profile is also an important determinant of 
j
ioverest . Not surprisingly, a 
longer stated latency period in the scenario makes respondents more likely to underestimate 
the latency and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
23
 The scenario adjustment data with respect to latency thus suggests that underestimation 
predominates. This may reflect opinions that acute cases of major illness do not typically come as a 
complete surprise. They often occur after years of decline in the individual’s general level of health. 
Cameron, T. A., J. R. DeShazo and E. H. Johnson, Journal of Choice Modelling, 4(1), pp. 9-43   
 
32 
 
Table A-1:  Descriptive Statistics for Correlates of Scenario Adjustment Variables 
      Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
 
Will never benefit from program*   1 jinever  0.077    
 Minimum overestimate of latency** 
j
ioverest  -8.12 12.3 -58 29 
 Minimum overestimate if latency overestimated 
j
ioverest  > 0  7.72 6.45 1 29 
 Minimum overestimate if latency underestimated 
j
ioverest  < 0 -15.2 10.8 -58 -1 
Attributes of stated illness profile     
 Duration of pain/disability (months if less than 60) 35.8 38.0 0 192 
 1(Longterm pain/disability) (>60 months) 0.288 0.453   
Age/gender/income of respondent     
 Age of respondent (years) 49.9 14.9 25 93 
 1(Female) 0.504    
 Income ($10,000) 5.18 3.38 0.5 15.0 
Educational attainment     
 1(Less than HS) 0.104 0.305   
 1(High School) 0.337 0.473   
 1(Some College) 0.251 0.433   
Objective health status     
 1(Have same illness) 0.040 0.195   
 Count of other major illness 0.294 0.578   
Subjective health risks     
 Subjective risk, same illness -0.223 1.24   
 Subjective risk, other illness -0.242 0.861   
 Avg room to improve health habits 3.446 0.831   
Respondent’s household structure     
 Size of household 2.57 1.26   
 1(Have kids) 0.287 0.452   
 1(Single parent) 0.017 0.129   
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.647 0.478   
 1(Have kid at onset) 0.029 0.169   
 1(Single parent & kid at onset) 0.001 0.030   
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) 0.023 0.150   
* To conserve space, descriptive statistics are based on illness profiles with complete data for the model to explain 
overest (i.e. 12,596 observations). Proportion for variable 1(never) is displayed for the 13,626 illness profiles with 
complete data when this is the dependent variable. 
** 29.3 percent of the minimum overestimate of latency (overest) observations are equal to zero. Note that overest = 0 if 
the respondent’s subjective latency interval contains the latency stated in the survey. 
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Table A-2:  Models to explain “Never (Program would not benefit me)” 
  
1 - Binary Logit 
1( )jinever  
2 - Binary Logit 
1( )jinever  
Attributes of illness profile   
 Duration of pain/disability (months if less than 60) 0.001 0.000 
  (0.57) (0.50) 
 1(Longterm pain/disability >60 months) -0.157 -0.155 
  (1.97)** (1.95)* 
Some demographic characteristics of respondents   
 Age of respondent (years) -0.006 - 
  (0.45)  
 Age
2
/100 0.010 - 
  (0.79)  
 1(Female) 0.375 0.381 
  (5.61)*** (5.71)*** 
Educational attainment   
 1(Less than HS) -0.254 -0.213 
  (2.09)** (1.77)* 
 1(High School) -0.274 -0.246 
  (3.27)*** (2.98)*** 
 1(Some College) -0.143 -0.136 
  (1.64) (1.57) 
Objective health status   
 1(Have same illness) 0.187 0.222 
  (0.99) (1.18) 
 Count of other major illness 0.116 0.146 
  (1.99)** (2.61)*** 
Subjective health risks   
 Subjective risk, same illness -0.342 -0.343 
  (10.15)*** (10.20)*** 
 Subjective risk, other illness 0.152 0.147 
  (3.23)*** (3.12)*** 
 Avg room to improve health habits -0.081 -0.094 
  (2.01)** (2.36)** 
Respondent’s household structure   
 Size of household 0.144 0.140 
  (3.54)*** (3.70)*** 
 1(Have kids) -0.167 -0.219 
  (1.42) (1.96)* 
 1(Single parent) 0.578 0.564 
  (2.48)** (2.48)** 
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.017 - 
  (0.22)  
 1(Have kid at onset) 0.064 - 
  (0.16)  
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -0.173 - 
  (0.37)  
 Constant -2.720 -2.708 
   (6.85)*** (15.76)*** 
Observations 13626 13626 
Log L -3550.8 -3552.8 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
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significant at 1%. 
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Table A-3:  Models to explain Minimum Over-Estimate of Latency (overest) 
  
  1 - OLS 
j
ioverest  
2 - OLS 
j
ioverest  
3 – OLS 
j
ioverest  
4 –OLS 
j
ioverest  
5 – OLS 
(Interval )* 
j
ioverest  
Attributes of illness profile      
 Pain/disability (months if <60) 0.033 0.033 0.012 0.011 0.011 
  (11.38)*** (11.37)*** (4.65)*** (4.31)*** (4.15)*** 
 1(pain/disability) (>60 months) 0.502 0.499 0.578 0.574 0.578 
  (2.07)** (2.06)** (2.76)*** (2.74)*** (2.61)*** 
Some demographic characteristics of respondents   
 Age of respondent (years) 0.314 0.311 0.012 - - 
  (6.92)*** (6.87)*** (0.15)   
 Age-squared (100s of years) -0.116 -0.113 -0.078 - - 
  (2.70)*** (2.64)*** (1.10)   
 1(Female) -0.205 - - - - 
  (0.99)     
Educational attainment      
 1(Less than HS) -1.832 -1.876 -1.712 -1.813 -1.949 
  (4.79)*** (4.93)*** (5.21)*** (5.52)*** (5.64)*** 
 1(High School) -0.673 -0.701 -0.559 -0.587 -0.516 
  (2.56)** (2.68)*** (2.47)** (2.59)*** (2.15)** 
 1(Some College) -0.239 -0.256 -0.375 -0.365 -0.405 
  (0.86) (0.92) (1.56) (1.52) (1.59) 
Objective health status      
 1(Have same illness) -2.554 -2.542 -2.125 -2.181 -2.118 
  (4.70)*** (4.67)*** (4.52)*** (4.64)*** (4.29)*** 
 Count of other major illnesses -0.567 -0.555 -0.640 -0.704 -0.718 
  (2.97)*** (2.90)*** (3.88)*** (4.28)*** (4.15)*** 
Subjective health risks      
 Subjective risk, same illness -1.115 -1.116 -1.411 -1.397 -1.471 
  (10.54)*** (10.56)*** (15.42)*** (15.28)*** (15.20)*** 
 Avg. subjective risk, other illness -0.039 -0.043 0.269 0.272 0.202 
  (0.25) (0.28) (2.01)** (2.04)** (1.43) 
 Avg. room to impr. health habits -0.973 -0.974 -0.976 -0.935 -0.931 
  (7.40)*** (7.41)*** (8.60)*** (8.27)*** (7.79)*** 
Latency Period      
 Stated latency - - -0.250 -0.204 -0.251 
    (2.22)** (3.09)*** (3.57)*** 
 (Stated latency)
2
 - - -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
    (0.78) (3.97)*** (6.36)*** 
 (Stated latency)*(Age) - - -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 
    (3.50)*** (3.42)*** (2.33)** 
 (Stated latency)*(Age
2
) - - 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
    (2.77)*** (0.58) (0.82) 
 (Stated latency) *1(Female) - - -0.025 -0.025 -0.019 
    (3.25)*** (3.20)*** (2.30)** 
Respondent’s household structure      
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 Size of household -0.118 - - - - 
  (0.88)     
 1(Have kids) -1.987 -2.208 -0.663 -0.673 -0.746 
  (5.38)*** (8.27)*** (2.81)*** (2.86)*** (2.99)*** 
 1(Single parent) -1.858 -1.794 -2.058 -1.993 -1.979 
  (2.20)** (2.15)** (2.85)*** (2.76)*** (2.60)*** 
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.701 0.625 0.754 0.763 0.769 
  (2.87)*** (2.74)*** (3.83)*** (3.88)*** (3.69)*** 
 1(Have current kid at onset) 14.445 14.371 2.557 3.304 3.903 
  (11.11)*** (11.07)*** (2.22)** (2.91)*** (3.24)*** 
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -2.681 -2.601 -2.354 -2.394 -2.679 
  (1.84)* (1.78)* (1.87)* (1.90)* (2.01)** 
 Constant -17.957 -18.157 8.782 6.449 7.290 
   (14.36)*** (14.64)*** (3.55)*** (12.29)*** (13.14)*** 
Observations 12596^ 12596 12596 12596 12596 
Log L     -33818.9 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.35  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
^Sample size is smaller for models in Table A-3 than Table A-2 since they do not include those individuals who said the 
program would never benefit them.  
* Interval-data model treats j
ioverest  as an interval rather than as an approximately continuous variable. This is done 
using the upper and lower estimates of the stated latency of the benefits of the program and using the intreg command in 
Stata. 
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APPENDIX B 
B.1  Extensive, rather than parsimonious, version of main model 
 
Table 3 in the main body of the paper gives parameter estimates from our model that 
corrects for scenario adjustment where all interaction terms with persistently insignificant 
coefficients have been dropped. Table B-1 in this Appendix provides the estimates for a 
model with the complete set of interactions. 
B.2  Alternative specification for the main model 
Tables B-2 and B-3 provide alternative estimates of the parameters and the simulated WTP 
distributions for a specification that assumes utility to be quadratic in net income, and where 
there is no discrete ―lump‖ of utility associated with either of the non-status-quo alternatives 
in each choice set (and no error component associated only with these alternatives. 
B.3  Extensive and parsimonious versions of a “small” model 
 
It may be important to demonstrate that the statistical significance of the interaction terms 
involving the two scenario adjustments variables in this study are not an artifact of the non-
linear functional form of the specification in the main model. Tables B-4 and B-5 
demonstrate that there are significant shifts in the estimated parameters even in simpler five-
parameter versions of the specification for the program choice model. 
B.4  Under- or over-estimate of latency (ordered discrete variable) 
 
In addition to the interval-data model for the overest variable documented in Model 5 in 
Appendix A, Table A-3, we also considered a second specification for over- or under-
estimating the latency. An ordered categorical variable _ jiordered latency  is explored in 
the context of an ordered logit model. The variable _ jiordered latency  is an ordered 
categorical variable that takes on the value 0 if the upper bound of the age interval checked 
among the selections in Figure 2 is lower than the stated age of onset given in the choice 
scenario. It takes the value 1 if the age interval checked in Figure 2 contains the stated age 
of onset, and take a value of 2 if the lower bound of the age interval lies strictly above the 
stated age of onset in the choice scenario. In these data, latency is underestimated for about 
54.6 percent of illness profiles, and it is overestimated for about 10.3 percent of profiles. 
Results for this model are displayed in Table B-4. Individuals are more likely to 
overestimate the latency of the illness if they have finished only high school, have 
temporary or long-term pain described the illness profile stated in the scenario, or will likely 
have a current child still in their household at the stated onset of the disease. Individuals are 
more likely to underestimate the length of the latency if they have a lower income, have 
either this illness or another major illness, have a higher subjective risk for this illness, have 
children, or will likely have a current child still in their household at the stated onset of the 
disease. 
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Table B-1:  Policy choice model with all interaction terms (1801 respondents, 7520 choices) 
Fixed effects conditional logit estimates Model A1 Model A2 
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected Corrected  1( )
j
inever   
j
ioverest  
  50 10 first income term   8.387 8.387 -2.702 0.248 
(10.03)*** (10.03)*** (0.76) (4.11)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -2.385 -2.385 10.235 -0.027 
(3.86)*** (3.86)*** (2.95)*** (0.64) 
   10 log 1jS ji ipdvi    -58.359 -58.359 248.650 7.233 
(5.05)*** (5.05)*** (3.87)*** (7.13)*** 
        13 ( ) log 1jS ji i iP sel P pdvi           
3.892 3.892 6.055 0.012 
(2.15)** (2.15)** (0.60) (0.08) 
   2 log 1jS ji ipdvr    -51.663 -51.663 -60.728 1.177 
(4.52)*** (4.52)*** (1.12) (1.00) 
   30 log 1jS ji ipdvl    -1019.412 -1019.412 499.341 5.900 
(4.11)*** (4.11)*** (0.49) (0.36) 
         31 0 log 1jS ji i iage pdvl    48.701 48.701 -19.464 -0.309 
(4.80)*** (4.80)*** (0.47) (0.41) 
         232 0 log 1jS ji i iage pdvl    -0.412 -0.412 0.144 0.012 
(4.24)*** (4.24)*** (0.36) (1.47) 
   
2
40 log 1
jS j
i ipdvl       
339.442 339.442 484.391 -3.979 
(3.13)*** (3.13)*** (0.81) (0.41) 
         
2
41 0 log 1
jS j
i i iage pdvl       
-17.555 -17.555 -7.705 0.308 
(3.95)*** (3.95)*** (0.33) (0.72) 
         
2
2
42 0 log 1
jS j
i i iage pdvl       
0.148 0.148 0.032 -0.006 
(3.44)*** (3.44)*** (0.15) (1.24) 
   
 
50 log 1
               log 1
jS j
i i
j
i
pdvi
pdvl
     
   
 
141.815 141.815 -416.324 -13.371 
(1.55) (1.55) (0.89) (1.42) 
      
   
 
51 0 log 1
                          log 1
jS j
i i i
j
i
age pdvi
pdvl
     
   
 
-6.993 -6.993 -0.117 0.434 
(1.95)* (1.95)* (0.01) (1.07) 
      
   
 
2
52 0 log 1
                          log 1
jS j
i i i
j
i
age pdvi
pdvl
     
   
 
0.063 0.063 0.101 -0.005 
(1.85)* (1.85)* (0.58) (1.20) 
Log L -11694.646 -10948.179 
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Table B-2: Policy Choice Model (1801 respondents, 7520 choices) 
Fixed effects conditional logit estimates Model 1 Model 2 
(Parameter) Variable 
Uncorrected 
Coef. 
Corrected 
Coef. 
 1( )jinever   
j
ioverest  
  50 10 first income term   5.183 8.071 - 0.225 
(8.30)*** (10.69)***  (5.14)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -.1992 -.2109 .7656 - 
(4.22)*** (4.15)*** (3.05)***  
   10 log 1AS Ai ipdvi    -47.89 -57.32 212.7 7.083 
(5.35)*** (5.04)*** (3.91)*** (7.24)*** 
   11 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi          
3.372 3.853 - - 
(2.34)** (2.45)**   
   2 log 1AS Ai ipdvr    -16.49 -57.93 - - 
(1.76)* (5.77)***   
   30 log 1AS Ai ipdvl    -580.1 -858.3 - 4.092 
(3.25)*** (4.28)***  (3.26)*** 
         31 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl    20.46 43.15 - - 
(2.82)*** (5.41)***   
         232 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl    -0.1874 -0.3719 - 0.0064 
(2.70)*** (4.97)***  (7.39)*** 
   
2
40 log 1
AS A
i ipdvl      
199.3 281.8 395.6 - 
(2.41)** (3.11)*** (4.51)***  
         
2
41 0 log 1
AS A
i i iage pdvl      
-7.786 -15.71 -5.197 - 
(2.32)** (4.31)*** (3.69)***  
         
2
2
42 0 log 1
AS A
i i iage pdvl      
0.0739 0.1365 - -0.0013 
(2.27)** (3.90)***  (3.12)*** 
   
 
50 log 1
               log 1
AS A
i i
A
i
pdvi
pdvl
   
 
  
 
 
102.4 129.6 -348.0 -4.301 
(1.40) (1.62) (3.77)*** (3.90)*** 
      
   
 
51 0 log 1
                          log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
   
 
  
 
 
-4.484 -6.680 - - 
(1.57) (2.16)**   
      
   
 
2
52 0 log 1
                          log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
   
 
  
 
 
0.0561 0.0624 0.0752 - 
(2.10)** (2.17)** (3.28)***  
Log L -11694.646 -10954.934 
a 
Corrected utility parameters are purged of scenario adjustment as captured by systematic differences in 
these parameters for alternatives where stated latency was not accepted by the respondent. 
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Table B-3:  Willingness to pay for a microrisk reduction (mean [5
th
, 95
th
 
percentiles]
a
) Without and with correction for illness scenario adjustment (Income 
= $42,000) 
  No latency
b Latency of 20 yrs 
Age Illness profile Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
30 1 year sick, recover $ 2.49 
[1.3,3.94] 
$ 3.20 
[2.43,4.07] 
$ 1.54 
[0.77,2.49] 
$ 1.94 
[1.43,2.50] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.75 
[2.59,5.16] 
3.94 
[3.13,4.86] 
2.32 
[1.60,3.20] 
2.35 
[1.87,2.90] 
 1 year sick, then die 4.14 
[1.67,6.80] 
6.52 
[4.89,8.40] 
4.42 
[3.26,5.97] 
1.67 
[0.97,2.42] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 4.19 
[1.39,7.21] 
7.02 
[5.05,9.12] 
4.57 
[3.51,6.00] 
1.99 
[1.42,2.65] 
 Sudden death 4.26 
[1.30,7.38] 
5.74 
[3.96,7.64] 
4.35 
[2.97,6.04] 
1.42 
[0.55,2.28] 
45 1 year sick, recover 2.33 
[1.20,3.75] 
2.68 
[1.93,3.48] 
1.33 
[0.64,2.15] 
1.27 
[0.82,1.72] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.56 
[2.45,4.92] 
3.47 
[2.73,4.33] 
2.08 
[1.44,2.84] 
1.68 
[1.29,2.12] 
 1 year sick, then die 4.59 
[2.99,6.55] 
7.61 
[6.39,9.09] 
2.53 
[1.95,3.21] 
-0.93
 c 
[-1.59,-0.37] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 4.44 
[2.73,6.66] 
8.48 
[7.04,10.14] 
2.66 
[2.16,3.32] 
-0.39
 c 
[-0.89,0.04] 
 Sudden death 4.57 
[2.88,6.58] 
6.10 
[4.88,7.39] 
2.43 
[1.71,3.19] 
-1.37
 c 
[-2.15,-0.70] 
60 1 year sick, recover 2.21 
[1.07,3.46] 
2.04 
[1.31,2.75] 
1.11 
[0.55,1.67] 
0.30 
[-0.08,0.63] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.26 
[2.19,4.5] 
2.86 
[2.19,3.62] 
1.66 
[1.22,2.11] 
0.59 
[0.27,0.87] 
 1 year sick, then die 2.40 
[0.98,4.03] 
6.41 
[5.26,7.82] 
1.27 
[0.57,1.91] 
-2.76
 c 
[-3.79,-1.97] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 0.92
 b 
[-0.6,2.58] 
6.93 
[5.65,8.48] 
1.23 
[0.67,1.78] 
-1.85
 c 
[-2.63,-1.27] 
 Sudden death 3.46 
[1.88,5.13] 
4.97 
[3.83,6.18] 
1.39 
[0.52,2.09] 
-3.20
 c 
[-4.32,-2.33] 
a
 Based on random draws from the joint distribution of the estimated parameters. 
b
 Zero latency was implausible to respondents in the illness profiles used to elicit program choices, 
so the minimum latency in the choice scenarios was 1 year. These values are thus extrapolated, 
based upon the fitted model.  
c
 Respondents were given no opportunity to express negative willingness to pay, so negative 
simulated values should be interpreted as zero WTP. 
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Table B-4:  Minimal Model (1801 respondents, 7520 choices) 
Fixed effects conditional logit estimates Model B1 Model B2 
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected Corrected  1( )
j
inever   
j
ioverest  
  50 10 first income term   5.342 9.991 -1.787 0.409 
(9.17)*** (12.98)*** (0.54) (7.40)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -2.160 -2.014 9.731 -0.026 
(4.61)*** (3.33)*** (2.84)*** (0.64) 
   10 log 1jS ji ipdvi    -27.053 -37.493 109.601 5.348 
(4.56)*** (4.99)*** (2.75)*** (7.75)*** 
     13 ( ) log 1jS ji i iP sel P pdvi           
3.297 3.475 5.121 -0.033 
(2.29)** (1.90)* (0.50) (0.23) 
   2 log 1jS ji ipdvr    -21.870 -37.893 -60.407 0.993 
(2.35)** (3.43)*** (1.13) (0.86) 
   3 log 1jS ji ipdvl    -30.409 -36.974 190.347 6.594 
(5.97)*** (5.89)*** (5.79)*** (11.12)*** 
Log L -11726.31 -11073.051 
 
 
 
 
Table B-5:  Parsimonious Minimal Model (1801 respondents, 7520 choices) 
Fixed effects conditional logit estimates Model B1’ Model B2’ 
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected Corrected  1( )
j
inever   
j
ioverest  
  50 10 first income term   5.342 9.816 -1.900 0.387 
(9.17)*** (14.00)*** (0.57) (10.18)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -2.160 -1.800 9.425 - 
(4.61)*** (3.58)*** (2.76)***  
   10 log 1jS ji ipdvi    -27.053 -37.184 103.398 5.398 
(4.56)*** (4.97)*** (2.72)*** (7.98)*** 
    13 ( ) log 1jS ji i iP sel P pdvi           
3.297 3.786 - - 
(2.29)** (2.39)**   
   2 log 1jS ji ipdvr    -21.870 -43.664 - - 
(2.35)** (4.45)***   
   3 log 1jS ji ipdvl    -30.409 -36.855 188.932 6.619 
(5.97)*** (5.89)*** (5.74)*** (11.22)*** 
Log L -11726.31 -11074.305 
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Table B-6:  Correlates of overest as a discrete variable (12596 illness profiles) 
  
  1 – Ordered  
logit  
j
ioverest  
2 – Ordered 
logit  
j
ioverest  
3 – Ordered 
logit  
j
ioverest  
Attributes of illness profile    
 
Duration of pain/disability 
(months if less than 60) 0.004 0.002 0.002 
  (5.05)*** (1.93)* (1.99)** 
 
1(Longterm pain/disability) 
(>60 months) 0.064 0.094 0.095 
  (0.93) (1.30) (1.32) 
Some demographic characteristics of 
respondents    
 Age of respondent (years) 0.036 0.000 - 
  (2.72)*** (0.00)  
 Age-squared (100s of years) -0.029 0.003 - 
  (2.34)** (0.15)  
 1(Female) 0.005 - - 
  (0.09)   
Educational attainment    
 1(Less than HS) -0.939 -0.940 -0.936 
  (6.80)*** (6.68)*** (6.67)*** 
 1(High School) -0.040 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.57) (0.07) (0.10) 
 1(Some College) -0.202 -0.207 -0.209 
  (2.62)*** (2.57)** (2.60)*** 
Objective health status    
 1(Have same illness) -0.679 -0.654 -0.651 
  (3.20)*** (3.01)*** (3.00)*** 
 Count of other major illness -0.119 -0.137 -0.132 
  (2.08)** (2.28)** (2.23)** 
Subjective health risks    
 Subjective risk, same illness -0.132 -0.200 -0.201 
  (4.38)*** (6.25)*** (6.28)*** 
 Subjective risk, other illness -0.081 -0.031 -0.028 
  (1.86)* (0.68) (0.62) 
 
Avg room to improve health 
habits -0.155 -0.174 -0.178 
  (4.30)*** (4.59)*** (4.72)*** 
Latency Period    
 Stated latency - 0.013 0.010 
   (0.24) (0.31) 
 Stated latency squared - -0.003 -0.003 
   (6.86)*** (7.70)*** 
 Latency and age interaction - 0.003 0.002 
   (1.35) (1.86)* 
 Latency and age squared - -0.000 -0.000 
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interaction 
   (3.19)*** (4.71)*** 
    
Continued...    
Respondent’s household structure    
 Size of household -0.011 - - 
  (0.29)   
 1(Have kids) -0.284 -0.097 - 
  (2.64)*** (1.13)  
 1(Single parent) -1.204 -1.319 -1.387 
  (2.80)*** (3.06)*** (3.25)*** 
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.107 0.120 0.107 
  (1.55) (1.82)* (1.67)* 
 1(Have kid at onset) 1.809 0.155 - 
  (6.80)*** (1.03)  
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -0.330 - - 
  (1.13)   
Observations 12596 12596 12596 
Log L -4259.161 -3697.929 -3698.915 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
